Researchers from ESET published 43-page report with analysis of the Ebury rootkit and related activity. It is claimed that Ebury has been in use since 2009 and has since been installed on more than 400 thousand servers running Linux and several hundred systems based on FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Solaris. Around 110 thousand servers remained affected by Ebury at the end of 2023. The study is of particular interest given that Ebury was involved in the attack on kernel.org, which reveals some new details about the compromise of the Linux kernel development infrastructure identified in 2011. Ebury was also detected on domain registrar servers, crypto exchanges, Tor exit nodes, and several unnamed hosting providers.
It was initially assumed that the attackers who attacked the kernel.org servers remained undetected for 17 days, but according to ESET, this time was calculated from the moment the Phalanx rootkit was installed, and the Ebury backdoor had been on the servers since 2009 and could be used for about two years to gain root access to the servers . The Ebury and Phalanx malware were installed as part of different attacks that do not overlap with each other and are carried out by different groups of attackers. The introduction of the Ebury backdoor affected at least 4 servers in the kernel.org infrastructure, two of which were affected within approximately two years, and the remaining two within 6 months.
The attackers gained access to the password hashes of 551 users stored in /etc/shadow, including all kernel maintainers (the accounts were used to access Git; after the incident, the passwords were changed, and the access model was revised and switched to using digital signatures). For 257 users, the attackers were able to determine cleartext passwords, presumably by guessing passwords using hashes and by intercepting passwords used in SSH by the malicious Ebury component.
The malicious component Ebury was distributed as a shared library, which, once installed, intercepted functions used in OpenSSH to establish a remote connection to a system with root rights. The attack was not targeted and, like thousands of other hosts affected, kernel.org servers were used as part of a botnet to send spam, steal credentials for distribution to other systems, redirect web traffic and perform other malicious activities.
To penetrate the server to implement Ebury, unpatched vulnerabilities in the server software were used, for example, vulnerabilities in hosting panels, or intercepted passwords (it is assumed that the kernel.org servers were hacked as a result of compromising the password of one of the users who had shell access). Vulnerabilities such as Dirty COW were used to escalate privileges.
New versions of Ebury used in recent years, in addition to the backdoor, included such features as modules for Apache httpd for proxying traffic, redirecting users and intercepting confidential information, a kernel module for making changes to transit HTTP traffic, tools for hiding your own traffic from firewalls , scripts for conducting AitM attacks (Adversary-in-the-Middle, bidirectional MiTM) to intercept SSH credentials in hosting provider networks.
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