In the next update secure mobile platform GrapheneOS 2024053100 An emergency data blocking feature has appeared on the device. The user is given the opportunity to set an additional password and PIN code, the entry of which will lead to clearing all keys in hardware storage, including the keys used to encrypt data on the drive, as well as clearing the eSIM and rebooting. Thus, if pressure is exerted on the user and he is forced to unlock the screen, or if there is a threat of the smartphone falling into the wrong hands, the owner of the device can enter a destructive PIN code and block data without the possibility of restoring access.
The GrapheneOS project develops a fork of the Android codebase (AOSP, Android Open Thanks for reading Project), extended and modified to enhance security and ensure privacy. Most current Google Pixel devices are officially supported (Pixel 4/5/6/7/8, Pixel Fold, Pixel Tablet). Project developments spread under MIT license. Part included many experimental technologies related to strengthening application isolation, granular access control, blocking the manifestation of typical vulnerabilities and complicating the operation of exploits.
For example, the platform uses its own implementation malloc and a modified version libc with protection against memory corruption, as well as more rigid division of the address space of processes. Instead of JIT, Android Runtime uses only AOT (ahead-of-time) compilation. The Linux kernel includes many additional protection mechanisms, such as adding canary tags to slub to block buffer overflows. SELinux and seccomp-bpf are used to enhance application isolation.
It is possible to selectively grant access to individual applications to network operations, sensors, address book and peripheral devices (USB, camera). By default, obtaining information about IMEI, MAC address, SIM card serial number and other hardware identifiers is prohibited. Reading from the clipboard is only allowed for applications that currently have input focus. Included Additional measures to isolate Wi-Fi and Bluetooth-related processes and prevent leaks from wireless activity. Many of the security enhancement mechanisms developed within the project carried over into the main Android codebase.
GrapheneOS uses cryptographic verification of load components and advanced data encryption at the ext4 and f2fs file system level (data is encrypted using AES-256-XTS, and file names are AES-256-CTS using HKDF-SHA512 to generate a separate key for each file ), not a block device. Data in system partitions and in each user profile is encrypted with different keys. Uses available hardware capabilities to speed up encryption operations. The lock screen displays a session end button, which, when clicked, resets the decryption keys and places the vault in an inactive state. There is a setting to prevent the installation of additional applications in selected user profiles. To protect against password guessing, a system of delays is used, depending on the number of unsuccessful attempts (from 30 seconds to 1 day).
GrapheneOS fundamentally does not include Google applications and services, as well as alternative implementations of Google services, such as microG. At the same time, it is possible to install Google Play services in a separate isolated environment that does not have special privileges. The project is also developing several of its own applications focused on information security and privacy. In particular, they offer a browser Vanadium based on Chromium and a modified version of the WebView engine, protected PDF viewerfirewall, application Auditor for device verification and intrusion detection, application for working with the camera, aimed at ensuring confidentiality, and a system for creating encrypted backup copies Seedvault.
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