During the comprehensive security audit code, focused on a number of Tor components, 17 vulnerabilities were identified, one of which is rated as high-risk.
The audit was conducted by non-profit consulting organization Radically Open Security from April to August 2023 and covered the Tor browser for desktop and Android, exit nodes, open services (SWBS, Onionoo API and metrics server), infrastructure components, and testing and profiling tools. The results of the assessment were made public this week.
During the audit, which was a crystal box pentest (where the tester has access to the source code), 17 different problems were discovered. Most of them are medium- and low-risk flaws that can be used to conduct DoS attacks, downgrade or bypass security, or gain access to information. Some of these issues are due to the use of outdated or unsupported third-party components.
The most serious of the vulnerabilities found was a CSRF issue affecting the Onion Bandwidth Scanner (Onbasca). This vulnerability could allow an attacker to introduce their own bridges into the database.
Onbasca is a scanner launched by directory authority nodes, which keep records of all nodes currently running and monitor the state of the entire network. This helps monitor performance, load balance the Tor network, and detect attacks. However, bridges are not included in this list and may be useful for users in some countries as they are more difficult to block.
“Attackers can lure victims' directory authorities to their site and launch a CSRF attack once the victim's browser is on the same network as Onbasca. This occurs when the victim is using the Django web interface. As a result of pre-auth, attackers are able to inject IP addresses under their control into the database, says a report from Radically Open Security. “When the bridgescan command is called, which is executed regularly, the Onbasca application will connect to an attacker-controlled bridge.”
Let us recall that from November 2022 to April 2023, Tor security audits were also carried out by Cure53 specialists, who focused on identifying vulnerabilities associated with changes user interfaceas well as on bypass censorship.